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PERSONAL PROPERTY
By Roy

FRIEDIN*

In the field of Personal Property the. appellate court decisions, during
the period under review, follow the pattern set forth in previously decided
cases, and there is not a single case that departs from well-recognized principles. However, a brief mention will be made of the cases in order that the
general nature of personal property litigation during the review period
may be disclosed.
In Scoggins v. General Finance and Thrift Corporation' trover was
brought to recover an automobile purchased on a conditional sales agreement and also encumbered by a bill of sale to secure debt. The statement of
facts disclosed that the Bank of Warrenton had no notice of the existence
of a prior encumbrance, and that Scoggins had no notice of the existence
of the same prior encumbrance. Yet Scoggins failed to prevail, and was
mulcted for the value of the chattel he had meanwhile disposed of. The
court held that the recording of the conditional sales contract within the
36 day statutory period related back to the execution of the contract and
thus gave the assignee of the conditional sales agreement priority, notwithstanding the fact that the bill of sale was recorded seven days prior to
the recording of the conditional sales contract. The case emphasizes the
confusion in that phase of the law dealing with want of knowledge by a
purchaser of encumbered chattels where the encumbrance is evidenced by
conditional sales agreements or bills of sale to secure debt. To eliminate
this confusion, it seems that Georgia needs a market overt for automotive
vehicles or some statute (within constitutional limits) affording a system
of title registration of automobiles with indemnity to persons acting in
good faith relying on such registration.
Another trover action was decided in Gostin v. Scott,2 which was a suit
to recover certain farm machinery. In a contract for the sale of land no
mention whatsoever was made of the machinery in question, yet the vendee
subsequently requested the machinery. The vendor, though astonished,
yielded the same to him. The trial court granted a nonsuit, but on appeal
the case was reversed, the court holding that the contract of sale did not
mention anything about the machinery and that, without such mention,
the machinery did not pass with the land. The court further held that
the elements of a valid gift were lacking and that the vendor was not
estopped to assert her title. The facts presented a jury question as to
whether there was a bona fide compromise of a doubtful claim.
The case of Guest v. Stone' dealt with a suit to recover money in a savings deposit. One Montgomery had given a savings account passbook and a
signed check to the defendant and had said that in case he died, the money
belonged to the defendant as the beneficiary of the fund. A notation was
*Member Vienna Bar; Member American and Georgia Bar Associations.
80 Ga. App. 847, 57 S.E.2d 686 (1950) ; Cf. 5 AM. JUR. § 111; Paglia v. State, 99
N.Y.S.2d 878; GA. CONST. Art. VII, § 1, t 2, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5402 (1948 Rev.);
GA. CODE Ch. 60 (1933)..
2. 80 Ga. Amp. 630, 56 S.E.2d 778 (1949).
3. 206 Ga. 239, 56 S.E.2d 247 (1949).
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made on the deposit slip designating the defendant as the beneficiary of the fund. After the death of Montgomery, the administratrix
sued to recover the funds. The court held that the evidence did not make
out a valid gift, either inter vivos or causa mortis. Nor was there a trust
shown in favor of the defendant. The formalities of a will were lacking,
which fact rendered the instrument unenforceable as a testamentary disposition.. Montgomery actually retained control over the money until he
died, thus in the absence of the elements of a will, gift cause mortis,
or trust, the administratrix was entitled to recover the amount of the funds.
In disposing of the case of Elliott v. Levy," which involved the bailment
of an automobile, the court held that in a suit for damages to an automobile held by a bailee, a showing of ordinary care on the part of the bailee
precludes recovery by the bailor. In a case involving the bailment of an
airplane, Bailey v. Insurance Company of North America, the court held
that the evidence was sufficient for submission to the jury on the question
of whether the bailor's or bailee's negligence caused the damage. The case
reiterated the rule that a prima facie case is made out when the bailor
shows that the bailed property was given to the bailee in a good condition
and returned in a damaged condition, but that such prima facie case is rebuttable by a showing that the damage was caused by other than the bailee's
negligence.
In the case of Jackson v. Jackson6 the only relevant portion of the decision deals with the simple proposition of what constitutes a valid gift.
The evidence pointed to the fact that words sufficient to make out a valid
gift were present.
Two cases were handed down during the survey period that met squarely
with the needs of commerce and accorded with sound sense. In the first one,
McEnt're v. Burns,' the court held, in applying Code Sections 67-1o8 and
67-1401 et seq, that the county of the mortgagor's domicile and legal residence, and not the county in which the temporary purpose of recreation
is supplied, is the county of residence. The McEntyre case also involved
the sufficiency of filing a conditional sales agreement where the motor
number of an automobile was erroneously recorded. The court held that
under such facts, constructive notice was afforded. The case is difficult to
reconcile with Master Loan Service v. Maddox,' in which an erroneous
motor number in respect to a single symbol did not afford constructive notice. When it is considered that a motor number may have 9 or io numerals,
it would seem that the deviation in recording a single figure from the true
description would require an intending purchaser or lien holder to make inquiry, with the incidents that would attach from such inquiry's being made.
However, the application of the beforementioned Cod e s e c t i o n s
squares with the functional needs of commerce. Likewise, Evans Motors of
Georgia, Inc. v. Gump Finance Corporation' held that the recordation of
a conditional sales contract executed in a state other than Georgia should,
4.
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as against a subsequent vendee, be recorded in the county where the property is located at the time of filing in Georgia, when such property is subsequently brought into the state. The court said that filing in a county
through which the property might have passed previously is insufficient
notice to protect a conditional vendor. Had the case been decided otherwise, a filing in any county within the state would be sufficient. Obviously
this would not be a desirable result. The decision reached accords with good
sense and the needs of commerce.
In Higgs v. Willis'" suit was brought to enforce an alleged kift of a portion of the insurance proceeds to be derived from an insurance policy on
the life of the donor. The court held that the words, "for love and affection
that I have for her and the many nice things that she has done for me,"
contained in a writing by the donor were insufficient to constitute a gift
causa mortis, in that a sufficient good consideration was not shown to uphold the writing. The court further held that the allegations in the petition failed to establish a close relationship by affinity or consanguinity,
or a moral obligation owed the donee, or any legal or equitable duty to
turn over a portion of the insurance proceeds. This case emphasizes the
necessity for thorough and complete pleadings. A review of the actual facts
might possibly reveal that the requisite elements of a valid gift were present, and that a bona fide intent of the donor to benefit the donee was
thwarted by the petition in which the plaintiff failed to allege the character
and value of the alleged "nice things" coupled with the purported "love
and affection."
In a trover suit for an automobile, the court held that the allegation of
the plaintiff that the defendant had swapped to him an encumbered automobile was insuffiient in that it did not disclose what type encumbrance
it was or that it was on the car at the time of the swap. 1 Unless the type
of encumbrance is proved, the jury is not authorized to find sufficient
fraud to entitle a plaintiff to rescind a contract and subsequently to maintain a trover action.
As will be noticed, a great many of the cases under review have been disposed of, not on questions of personal property, but instead, on various
procedural grounds. Such was the case in Forsyth v. South Side Motors,
Iic.,'2 wherein the court reversed a judgment of nonsuit saying that an
amendment can cure a mere clerical error in the description of property
that was the subject matter of the case if it is apparent that the descriptions are so alike that the same property was meant by the petition and the
pleader. Here, a motor number was alleged in the petition to be 98 BAL1 3
2580, when actually it was 98 BA 125850. In the next appeal of the case,
the trover action was successfully maintained, the court saying that the
jury could find that the defendant had actual knowledge of a title reservation contract.
10. 205 Ga. 857, 55 S.E.2d 372 (1949).
11. Milam v. Gray, 80 Ga. App. 356, 56 S.E.2d 168 (1949).
12. 79 Ga. App. 719, 54 S.E.2d 445 (1949).

13. South Side Motors, Inc. v. Forsyth, 81 Ga. App. 374, 59 S.E.2d 29 (1950).
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In Healan v. Huff'4 the plaintiff filed a money rule against the defendant
alleging that the defendant had sold, under execution issued in foreclosure
proceedings in favor of a finance company, an automobile on which the
plaintiff had done repair work for which he had not been paid. The court
held in favor of the defendant, saying that there was insufficient evidence
of a joint enterprise between the owner of the car and an insurance company which had, after a wreck, paid him the proceeds of a policy, in order
that the damage could be repaired. If such an enterprise had existed, the
plaintiff would have been entitled to prevail.
The case of Carithers v. Maddox 5 dealt only with the value of an automobile recoverable in trover proceedings. A previous trial of the case" '
had established title in the plaintiff, and the evidence sufficiently warranted
the finding made of the value at the time of conversion.
In the case of Ingram v. Barfield" the court, in a suit to foreclose a
materialman's lien, held that it is incumbent upon the owner to see that the
contractor pays materialmen and laborers to the extent of their claims.
Failure to do so renders the owner liable in case there is a misappropriation.
In Bedgood v. Karp's U-Drive-It Co." the defendant admitted liability
for the conversion of an automobile. The sole question in the case was
whether or not the evaluation was too high. The court, in affirming the lower court, held that the plaintiff was entitled to the highest proved value between the conversion and the date of trial.
9 involved a bailor (prospective seller) and a
Bowyer v. Cummings"
bailee (prospective purchaser). The suit was by a third person for damages resulting from a collision Which the bailee had while "trying out"
the bailor's automobile. The court held thit the bailee's operation of the
automobile after discovering the defective condition of the brakes, which
condition was also known to the bailor, was not the sole proximate cause
of the collision as a matter of law. A jury. question was generated by the
allegation that the bailor had knowledge of the defect.
"Courts should deal with practical problems in a practical way, and give
the same sense to a plain and ordinary business transaction which is uniformly attached to it by the business world." So spoke Justice Evans in
Pollak Bros. v. Niall-Herin Co." Furthermore "covenants of warranty
should be so construed as to require and encourage the utmost good faith
in all the contracting parties."'" In addition, the courts should not in any instance countenance transactions where it is evident that a party is endeavoring, in an improper manner, to obtain something for nothing."
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